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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif f·Appcllant,
vs.

Case No.
12981

ROYS. LUDLOW,
Defcndant-Rcspondent.

Brief of Defendant-Respondent
STATRl\IENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff-appellant in its statement of facts
has completed misstated or neglected to state the facts
and issues in the instant case.
The proffer of proof at the preliminary hearing
made by the plaintiff and defendant showed that on
the 22nd day of April, 1971, a deputy sheriff, Mr. Tom
.Worlrl, went to the manufacturing plant of Hydroswift Corporation to serve a small claims affidavit and
summons upon one Gayleen Thompson, who was then
employed by Hydroswift Corporation (R-16}. See
78-6-3, UCA, 1953 for form of affidavit and summons.
The defendant was the president of said corporation.
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Deputv 'Vorhl was advised by defendant that sli
. • .
•
.
e was
work.mg. m the manufadurmg part of the I)laiit m~
·
area of volatile substances which were critical as to
their nature and that she could not come to the adnlIO·
· '
istrative offices at that time to be served (R-17). The
plant consist of three separate buildings including the
administrative building. l\Ir. Ludlow stated that he
woulcl bring her up either at break time or after work
so she could be sen·ed in the offices (ll-17). l\Ir. World
insisted that he would go back into the plant to sel'\'e
the papers then and there and .l\Ir. Ludlow advised him
that he could not go back into the plant as no one was
permitted in that area in which she was working other
than authorized personnel ( R-17) . Deputy 'Vorlcl being
denied access to the manufacturing portion of the plant
statecl that he would be back and left. He returned the
next day "·ith a warrant of arrest charging the defendant
with the indictable misdemeanor of obstructing an offi.
cer in the discharge of his duty in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 28, Section 54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, towit:
"That said John Doe aka l\Ir. Ludlow
did then and there ref use to permit the said
deputy sheriff on the premises for the purpose
of serving civil process." (R-16)
Plaintiff-appellant for the first time upon appeal
after no less than three hearings on this case raises the
point that it was the duty of the defendant to "produce"

3

the person to he served to the deputy sheriff and this is
the obstruction or resisting of which defendant is charged
with. This is totally adverse with the argument raised
previously hy the plaintiff. Mr. Sawaya, the Deputy
County Attorney argued solely the denial of the right
of entry into private property as a violation of the law
(R-139, lines 23-30, R-140, lines 1-2).
Plaintiff on page 5 of its brief states:
"The defendant could have at least made
an effort to determine ( 1) if the person whose
name appeared on the process was indeed that
of his employee and (2) if the employee was·
present on the defendant's premises."
This totally ignores the plaintiff's own proffer of proof
where Deputy 'Vorld admitted asking if Gayleen
Thompson was an employee and admitted that defendant said she was ( R-16) and was on the premises.
(R-16)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO STATE LAW WHICH
REQUIRES AN EMPLOYER TO
"PRESENT" AN EMPLOYEE TO A
PROCESS SERVER FOR SERVICE
OF PROCESS.

4

The information as filed does not alle e th·
1
f
at· the
le ernIan t f'a1·1c<1 to produce a JJerson for ti g
le service of
process by a process server but charges tJ d f
.
le e endant
with ''then and there refused to JJermit the . 'd I
'
...
sa1 c eputy
sherd f upon the premises for the purpose of
·
· ·1 process." (R-107)
servmg
c1n
. I>Iaintiff in its argument and POINT I now refm~iate5 the. al.legations of its own information upon
winch the crnnmal action was founded.
The State of Utah in the Bill of Particulars filed
by it the 23rd clay of February, 1972, alleged that the
statutory basis upon which the State of Utah relies
which permits a deputy sheriff to enter private property
for the purposes of serving civil process to be 68-3-I,
Utah Code Annotated 1953. (R-104)
There was no showing at the time of the prelim·
inary hearing that defendant in any way had denied
the deputy sheriff access into the office of the manufacturing company nor had ordered him out or off of
the company property. (R-16-17) The preliminary
hearing clearly showed that Deputy vVorld in no way
was denied access to the office but that he was denied
access to the manufacturing portion of the plant. (R-17·
18) The testimony of Deputy vVorld in the proffer of
proof made by the County Attorney was to the effect
that the sheriff's office had been advised as to the time
when service could be made on employees of Hydroswift by letter to the sheriff and that was at break time
or after work.

1

5

The state seeks to show some statutory or legal duty
for a party to produce another individual for the purposes of hnving civil procf:'.SS served upon him upon pain
of criminal prosecution if he fails to do so. The state
does not cite any statutory authority for this proposition !Jut merely alleges that it relies upon the common
law of the United States and of England. No case is
cited nor any statutory law cited which requires a person
to produce a third person to an officer of this state,
without some type of writ, warrant or other legal court
order-obviously there is none. This is actually a ludicrous position for the state to take inasmuch as an employer or other person has no control over a third person as to whether or not he will or will not be produced
and to require a person under the pain and penalty of
criminal prosecution to force a third person to appear
before a sheriff or a process server is far and beyond
the intent of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution which did away with slavery or involuntary servitude, the only conditions under which an employer could
compel an employee to appear. Apparently the State of
Utah now takes the position that an employer has the
right if not the duty to compel his employees to appear
before public officers for any purpose whatsoever that
the public officer may have in mind. Such is not the
law and such is not the facts of the case now before the
Court.
The real issue before the Court is whether or not
the deputy sheriff, Tom W odd, had the right to enter

6

I

into the man11 fad11rinµ; portion of an iIHlust :, I l \
. .
.
.
. . .
. 11a pan! .
f 01 the purposes of sernng c1nl process. (R-17) Ti'
. I
I .
111
JS t 1c so c 1ss11c that was before the committinrr
.
n lllaa 11. ,
trntc and before the Distriet Court when it was . "' ·
,
a1guer1 I
by the ( m~nty A ttc!rn~y on nume1:ous occasions in repl
1
to the mot10ns to <l1sm1ss and motions to quash filed bv ·
the defendant. The State ~lf Utah is anything butcandi~
in its hrie f ancl in its statement to the Court of the fact
and issues before the Court.
11

POINT II

THE L.A 'V DOES NOT ALLOW. A
PHOCESS SERYER TO ENTER PRIVATE PHOPERTY TO SERVE CIVIL
PHOCESS.
The Slate of Utah in its llill of Particulars affirm- \
atiYely relied, and relied solely, upon 68-3-1, Utah Code 1
Annotated, 1953 as the basis for maintaining its crim·
inal prost'c11tion of the defendant in this case. The
statute reads:
1

"Cnmrnon I ,aw Adopted. The common
law of England so far as it is not repugnant to,
m· in conflict with, the constitutional laws of
the U nitecl States, or the constitutional Jaws of
this state, and so far only as it is consistent
with and adopted to the natural and physical
conditions of this state and the necessities of
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the people hereof is hereby adopted and shall
be the rule of decision in all courts of this
state."
It is sn bmitted that this particular section of law
has no applicability in the instant case as the common
Jaw of England is repugnant to and in conflict with
the Constitution of the United States and the case law
of the United States and of the State of Utah.
No statutory law or rule or practice gives a sheriff
the right to enter private property to serve process on
a thinl person. See 17-22-2 UCA, 1953, Rule 4 URCP.

The leading case as tf1 what the common law of
England was is found in a case decided in 1604,
Scmayne's Case, 5 Coke !H(a), 77 ENG. Reprint, 194,
11 EXG. RUL. CAS. 628 (see footnote 5, LRA 1916
D 282) which held that the sheriff has no right to enter
a private dwelling except 'vith the king's writ and no
other.
57 ALR 210 states:
"The common law, both in }~11gland and
America, jealous of intrusion on domestic peace
and security, regards every man's house as his
castle and fortress as well for his defense
against injury and violence, as for his repose.
It is this ancient and well-known principle that
underlies the whole law of the right to break
and enter a dwelling house to serve civil writ

8

or proeess. AceordingJy, therefore ti
. .
• ie
au ti 10nties arc substantially agree<l that, as a
general rule, in the absence of statute, the
outer dt>or or other outside protection to a
dwelling house may not, even after request
and refusal of admittance, be broken or forcefully entered for the purpose of levying under
a writ of execution."
27 ALR 247 states:
"Preliminarily it may be noted that the
common law does not permit an officer to break
into a dwelling ewn after he has requested
and has heen refused permission to enter, for
the purpose of se1Ting a civil writ or process.
This rule is founded on a desire to protect the
home, and prevent injury and violence and is
one application of the action that a man's
home is his castle."

To the same effect see 42 Al\I .JUR 34, Process, § 38.

The State, in its argument, would adopt the rule
that a man's place of business does not have the same
protections that his home does. This construction of the
law is in direct conflict with the rulings of the Supreme
Court of the United States and of cases decided hy this
Court in conformity with the mandates of the Supreme
Court of the United States. In the case of .Mancusi v.
DcJ?ortc, 392 U.S. 364, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154, 88 S.Ct. 2120
(19u8) the Supreme Court stated:

"This Court has held that the word 'houses'
as it appears in the amendment (Fourth
Amendment, U.S. C~nstitution) is not to be
taken literally, and that the protection of the
amendment may extend to commercial prem. ,,
1ses.
In the case of See v. Seattle, 387 U.S ..541, 18
L.E<l.2d D43, 87 S ..Ct. 1737, it is stated:
"The businessman, like the occupant of a
residence, has a constitutional right to go about
his business free from unreasonable official ·
entries upon his private commercial property.
* * * "\Ve therefore conclude that administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions
of commercial premises which are not open to
the public, may only be compelled through
prosecution of physical force within the
framework of a warrant procedure."
See also Ca11iara v. ftlunicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 18
L.Ed.2d 930, 87 S.Ct. 1727.

POINT III
THE C 0 N D U C T OF DEPUTY
SHERIFF \VORLD CONSTITUTED
AN INVASION OF PRIVACY AND
AN ATTEMPTED SEARCH WITHIN

10

THE l\IEANING OF THE FOURTH
1\l\lEXDl\IENT TO THE· CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
The attempt of deputy sheriff \Vorld to enter
into the l'onfines of the manufacturing portion of th
. 1
.
e
llH ustnal plant constituted a search within the meanin(I
of the prnhihilions of the Fourth Amendment to th:
Constitution of the United States.
The Constitution of the United States provides in
the Fourth Amendment thereto:
"The right of the people to he secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizmes
shall not he violated and no one shall issue, but
upon probably cause supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place
to he seard1ecl and the persons or things to be
seized."
To the same effect see Article I, Section 14 of the '
Constitution of Utah. As stated previously in Illancusi
t'. Dc/i'ortc, supra, the word "houses" in the Fourth
.Amendment is not to be taken literally but includes
within the protections of the amendment commercial
prerrnses.
The prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go to
the protection of one's right to be free from unwanted
government intrusions into one's privacy.

11

'l'I 1e " propert y " concept as opposed to the "protedion of privacy" has been laid to rest by the Supreme
Court in the case of TVard1m, 1llaryland Penitentiary vs.
Hawlcn, H87 U.S. 294, 18 L.Ed.2d 782, 87 S. Ct. 1642,
wherein the Supreme Court stated:

"Searches and seizures may be 'unreasona hlc' within the Fourth Amendment even
though the government asserts a superior
property interest at common law. 'Ve have
recognized that the principal object of the
Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and have increas- ·
ingly disregarded fictional and procedural
harriers reste<l on property concepts."
That the Fourth Amen<lment is applicable to the
states has been decided in 11lapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
G L.Ecl.2<1. 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684.
The doctrine of "unwarranted governmental intrusion" has been increasingly asserted by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 17 L.E<l.2d 374, 87 S.Ct. 408. As stated
in the case of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 577, 22
L.Ed.2d. 542, 89 S.Ct. 1243:
"F'or also fundamental is the right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted government intrusions into
.
"
one ' s pnvacy.
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See to the same effect, Camara v. lJlunicipal Court
supra, Sec ·u. Seattle, supra, Katz v. ·U.S., 389 U.S. 3 '
47
19 L.Ecl.2d. 576, 88 S.Ct. 507, Johnson v. U.S., 3 3 ~
U.S. 10, 92 L.Ed. 436, GS S.Ct 367.
The Supreme Court of Utah has affirmed the Ca·
marn and S cc rationale and in the case of State v. Salt
Lake City, et al, 21 U.2d 318, 445 P.2d 691 (1968),
l\Ir. J usticc Callister in speaking for the majority observed:
"In Sfc v. Seattle, the Court held that the
basic component of a reasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment-that it is not to be
enforced without suitable warrant procedure
-is applicable to businesses as well as residential premises. Therefore, an entry upon commercial premises not open to the public may
only be compelled within the framework of a
warran t proce <lure. "
As pointed out by l\Ir. Justice Henriod in his concurring opinion:
"If an officer is on the premises lawfully
for one purpose he not only can, but has a
duty to make an arrest if in his browsing
aro~nd, he sees an offense presently being or
having been committed."
This reasoning is exactly the situation m the instant

(
I
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case. The process server, a deputy sheriff, on the premises for serving of civil process could make an arrest for
any alleged violation he c;ame across while making his
tour of the manufacturing plant while searching out
the whereabouts of a person whom he was seeking to
serve civil process upon. This is within the meaning of
what l\Ir. Justice Henriod said about police "browsing
arouml" on the priv~te business premises without a search
warrant.

In writing the majority decision in Salt Lalce City
v. Wheeler, 24 U.2<l 112, 466 P.2d 838 (1970) .M.r.
Justice Henriod again pointed out that there was u.
"mythicnl distinction between 'browsing' inspection and
'bruising' search". In this case See and Camara were
again affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. In the
case of TVJJman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 27 L.Ed.2d
408, \H S. Ct. 381, the United States Supreme Court
pointed out that where one refuses to allow a search of
premises and such refusal will result in criminal prosecution, such situation invokes the Canwra and See doctrine of unlawful search. This is the exact situation the
defendant in this case found himself in. If he did not
admit the deputy sheriff, he was subject to prosecution
and if he did admit him, his right to privacy and freedom of governmental intrusion was violated. The constitutional auarantee of the Fourth Amendment runs
both as to criminal or civil matters. U.S. v. Undetermined
Quantities of Stimulant Drugs (D.C. Fla., 1968), 282
F.Supp. 543; People v. Garcia, (1969) 74 Cal. Rptr.
~

14
103, 268 C.A.2d 712; Rogers v. U.S. (rnas)

Fd

P .2<l 6G9, ( 1971).

' 481

97 2
6!H. See Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 24 U.2d 333 '

POINT IV
TlIE UTAJI LA YV OF "\VHAT IS
l\IEANT BY "RESIST, DELAYS OR
OBSTRUCTS" IS VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN AND IS THEREBY UN.
CONSTITUTION AL AS APPLIED
IN THE INSTANT CASE AND VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
U::\TDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH Al\IENDl\IENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION 01~ THE UNITED
STATES.
It is submitted that the words "resist, delays or
obstructs" is left up to the determination of the public
officer who claims that he was resisted, delayed or obstructed. '\That may be resistance to one is not necessar·
ily resistance to another. "\Vhat may be a delay to one
is not a delay to another, and what is an obstruction to
one is not necessarily an obstruction to a third person.
Consequently, this is a judgment determination of the
public officer who seeks criminal prosecution for a vi.olation of 76-28-54, UCA, 1953, as is the defendant m
the instant case.

The Supreme Court of the United States has had
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many occasions to pass upon words of art in various
city ordinances and state statutes which invoke criminal
sandion where one has transgressed by action or deed
in violation of the meani~g of a particular word. In a
recent Supreme Court of the United States case, Coates
v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 29 L.Ed.2d. 214, 91 S.Ct.
1686 ( 1971) the Supreme Court in reversing a conviction of the person charged with having annoyed persons
passmg on a sidewalk observed:
"Conduct that annoys some people does
not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague
not in the sense that it requires a person to ·
conform his standard, but rather in the sense
that no standard of conduct is specified at all.
As a result 'men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning', Connelly v.
General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385,
391, 70 L.Ed. 322, 382, 46 S.Ct. 126."
It is to be noted that there is a distinction between
a statute which is unconstitutional on its face and a
statute which is unconstitutional as applied. In the instant case, it is the contention of the defendant that
76-28-54 is unconstitutional as applied in this case. As
observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 15 L.Ed.2d. 176,
180, 86 S.Ct. 211:
"As so construed, we cannot say that the
ordinance is unconstitutional, though it requires

16
no
great
feat
of imagination to enYision SJ'tUa•
•
•
tJons m which sueh an ordinance m 1'orr}1t be nn.
co11stitutionall/f applied." (Emphasis added)
In the case of Simon Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S
347, 12 L.Ed.2d. 894, 84 S.Ct. 1697, the Supreme Cour;
held that:
"The constitutional requirement of definiteness is vio]ated by a criminal statute that
f'ai]s to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed."
In the instant case the state now takes the position
that the person has the duty to produce a third person
for the senice of process upon him. 'Vhere in the stat·
utes of Utah is such conduct required? 'Vhere within
the meaning of 76-~8-54 can one of "reasonable intelli·
gence" determine that his failure to produce a third
person for service of process upon him is a violation of
the laws of Utah? In the authoritative work of Lawyers
Edition, following the rendition of the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Ashton v. Ken·
tucky, 384 U.S. 195, 16 L.Ed.2d. 469, 86 S.Ct. 1407
(I 9G6), an annotation dealing with "indefiniteness of
penal laws", found at page 1233 of 16 L.Ed.2d. states:
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"The rc<1uirement that crimes be defined
with appropriate <lefiniteness, which has been
referred to as a fun<lamental common law concept, is now generally hel<l to be an essential
element of <lue process of law. The constitutimia] requirement of definiteness is violated
by a criminal enactment that fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that
his contemplated con<luct is forbidden by the
statute. 'Vhile this rule has been expressed in
rnrying lanf.,ruage, the underlying principle is
that no man shall be held criminally responsible.
for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to he proscribed. The vice of vagueness in criminal statutes is the treachery they
conceal either in determining what persons are
included or what acts are prohibited. A generally worded statute which is construed to
punish conduct which cannot constitutionally
be punished is unconstitutionally vague to the
extent that it fails to give adequate warning
of the boundary bebveen the constitutionally
permissible and constitutionally impermissible
applications of the statute. Inexplicably contradictory commands in statutes ordaining
criminal penalties are judicially denied the
force of criminal sanction."
"Reasonable certainty in criminal enactments
is all the more essential when vagueness might
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induce in<livi<luals to forego their rights of
speceh, press an<l association for fear of violating an unclear law."
'

In the case of Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. \
399, 15 L.Ed.2d. 477, 86 S.Ct. 518 ( 1965) it was point.
ed out that a statute fails to meet the requirements of
the due process clause of the Constitution of the United
States if its so vague ancl standardless that it leaves
the public uneertain as to the conduct it prohibits or ·
leaves judges and jurors free to deci<le, without any
legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is
not. See also Unit cd States 'L'. National Dairy Products
Corporation, a72 U.S. 29, 9 L.Ed.2d. 561, 83 S.Ct. 594
( HHi3); Scull v. Virginia, 3irn U.S. 344, 3 L.Ed.2d. 865,
79 S.Ct. 8!38 ( 1959) ; United States v. Five Gambling
Dct·ices, 346 U.S. 441, 98 L.E<l. 179, 74 S.Ct. 190
( 1953). Perhaps the latest case speaking on the subject
is that of Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 29
L.Ed.2d. 98, 91 S.Ct. 1563 ( 1971) wherein the Supreme
Court in quoting from U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
I

98 L.Ed. 989, 7 4 S.Ct. 808 ( 1954) said:
"The un<lerlying principle is that no man
shall he held criminally responsible for conduct
which he could not reasonably understand to
be proscribt;d."
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized the
doctrines as announced by the Supreme Court of the
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United States. In the case of Ringwood v. State,
U.2<l 287, 3:J3 P.2d 943, the Supreme Court stated:

s

"\i\T e remain aware of the requirements of
our law that our statutes are to be given a
liberal interpretation to effectuate their purposes. That having been said, however, it must
also he recognized that where a statute charges
one with a duty or imposes a burden or penalty,
it must do so with sufficient clarity and definiteness that one of ordinary intelligence will
urnlerstand what he is required to do. And in
case of alernative choices, he can comply by ·
selecting the one which is the least burdensome
or least offensive to him."

See also State v. Packard, 122 U. 369, 250 P.2d 561
(1952); Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 U.2d 67, 305 P.2d
870 (1957); llcnry v. Rocky JYlountain Packing Cor·
poration, 113 U. 444, 202 P.2d 727, wherein the Supreme Court observed:

"It is a principle too familiar to require
citation of authority, that penal statutes, to be
constitutional, must be clear and definite in
their terms so that there may be known exactly
what conduct is proscribed."
See also 11lusser v. State of Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 92 L.Ed.
562, 68 S.Ct. 397, wherein the Supreme Court of the
United States in striking down a Utah law stated:
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"Statutes defining crimes may fail of their
purpose if they do not provide some reason~1hle. st:mdards of guilt." (Citing cases) "Legislation may run a foul of the due process
clause because it fails to give adequate guidance to those who would he law abiding, to
advise defendants of the nature of the offense
with which they are charged or to guide courts
in trying those who are accused."
The statute as applied in the instant case violates
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the District Court
did not err in quashing the information against the de·
fendant.

The state offered no authority for the proposition
that a deputy sheriff has the right to enter the private
domain of a person to sen'e civil process on another,
which contradicted or distinguished the mandates of
Camara and Sec.
The State in its brief on appeal has offered no
authority for the proposition that it is the legal duty
for an employer to produce his employee for a public
official, and his failure so to do will subject him to
criminal prosecution.
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It is submitted that the trial court should have
niled upon the constitutional issues raised by defendant,
that is the unlawful sear~h under the Fourth Amendment and the vague and uncertainity of 76-28-54, UCA,
1953, making it unconstitutional as applied. Defendant
now requests this court to rule upon the unconstitutionality of the conduct of Deputy World, and upon
the unconstitutionality of 76-28-54, UCA, 1953.

Respectfully Submitted.

PAUL N. COTRO-MANES
Attorney for Defendant·
Respondent

